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This study examines the factors affecting modes of commercializing patented inventions using a novel 
dataset  based  on  a  survey  of  U.S.  inventors.  We  find  that  technological  uncertainty  and  possessing 
complementary  assets  raise  the  propensity  for  internal  commercialization.  We  find  that  R&D 
collaboration with firms in a horizontal relationship is likely to increase the propensity to license the 
invention. In addition, the paper shows that macro-level environment conditions that affect exchange 
conditions, such as technology familiarity, influence the effects of capabilities on governance choice. 
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1.  Introduction 
A great deal of attention has been given to the determinants of governance structure. The most 
important theoretical achievement has been probably made by transaction costs economists (Williamson, 
2002). However, although TCE has proven to have strong predictive power on governance choice, it 
alone does not provide a comprehensive explanation about governance choice. While TCE focuses on the 
risk  of  ex  post  haggling  and  monitoring  costs  accompanying  exchange,  it  overlooks  the  roles  of 
transactional value (Zajac and Olsen, 1993), heterogeneous firm capabilities and production efficiency 
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998; Jacobides and Winter, 2005; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992), and inter-firm relationships (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Even Williamson himself admitted 
some of these weaknesses in TCE as shown in the following statement: “the roles of organizational 
knowledge and learning … are ones with which transaction cost economics deals with in only a limited 
way”  (Williamson,  2002).  This  paper  responds  to  this  call  by  providing  synthetic  arguments  that 
interweave the recent developments in TCE, capability-based views, and inter-firm ties and empirically 
testing these arguments using project-level data on invention characteristics and the commercialization 
decision for a broad sample of patented inventions.  
In the context of firm innovation, TCE argues that firms tend to internalize innovation as the 
appropriability hazard (Oxley, 1997, 1999) of market transactions increases. One key policy instrument 
for  reducing  the  appropriability  hazard  in  transacting  patented  inventions  is  to  strengthen  patent 
protection.  In  addition,  Teece  (1986)  argues  that  the  rent  from  innovation  accrues  to  the  holder  of 
difficult-to-reproduce complementary assets such as manufacturing, sales, and/or distribution capability. 
Following Teece’s argument, a firm having complementary assets is likely to use internal over external 
exploitation of the invention. In addition, recent work on innovation has emphasized the importance of 
inter-firm ties as a key driver of innovation performance, at both the firm dyad and whole network levels 
(Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). The literature about embedded ties (Powell et al., 
1996; Uzzi, 1997) and exploration-exploitation (March, 1991; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004) suggests that 
inter-organizational ties can be both important conduits for information flows, and can be alternative 
governance  structures  that  may  reduce  opportunism  and  facilitate  commercialization  across  firm 
boundaries.  
In this study, we build on and further these existing theories (TCE, firm capabilities and inter-
firm  ties)  in  the  context  of  commercializing  patented  inventions.  We  start  with  the  observation  that 
technological  innovation  comprises  invention  and  commercialization,  two  areas  that  require  different 
capabilities (Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988; Schumpeter, 1942). Given an invention, the inventor or owner 




production capabilities (in-house commercialization) and another is to seek external paths across firm 
boundaries. The most prominent external commercialization path is to license out the invention to others. 
The use of external paths of commercialization have important implications for firms’ competitiveness 
and the economy as a whole (Arora et al., 2001). 
Using a data set constructed from multiple information sources, including patent documents, a 
large-scale inventor survey, and financial information on firms, we find that technological uncertainty and 
possessing complementary assets raise the propensity for internal commercialization. R&D collaboration 
with firms in a horizontal relationship is likely to increase the propensity to choose external paths. In 
addition, we examine how technology uncertainty moderates the effects of firm production capabilities on 
the  likelihood  of  internal  commercialization.  We  also  show  that  horizontal  ties  might  moderate  the 
negative effects of high technology uncertainty on the rates of technology licensing, showing support for 
the conjecture that such ties may provide alternative governance mechanisms that reduce transaction costs. 
We review the literature and develop our hypotheses in the next section.  After describing the data and 
measures we report the results and conclude with a discussion of the findings and their implications. 
 
2.  Theory and Hypotheses 
When a firm considers whether it will take an in-house development path or alternative options 
such as collecting royalties by licensing to other firms or establishing a spin-off firm and taking equities 
(we call these alternative options “external commercialization” throughout the paper) for commercializing 
a  technology,  it  will  assess  the  relative  appropriability  between  them.  Certainly,  the  relative 
appropriability of internal to external commercialization must depend on many particulars of a given 
technology and strategic interactions among firms. However, besides those particulars, we argue in this 
paper that some general attributes of a given invention as characterized by the evolutionary stage of 
technology field or by its linkage to the firm’s production capabilities should affect a firm’s decision 
about the commercialization paths. We reason how the evolutionary stage of technology field affects the 
commercialization  paths  in  the  next  section  and  the  effect  of  a  linkage  between  an  invention  and 
production capabilities in the following section. In the final section, we discuss the effects of inventive 
inter-organizational ties on the governance choice of commercializing inventions. 
 
2.1. Technology Familiarity 
There are important differences between a mature and an emerging technological field, related to 
the nature of innovation, general level of cognitive difficulties in understanding and evaluating a new 
technology,  and  the  availability  of  complementary  technologies.  Below  we  show  how  these 




governance choices. To do so, we first discuss the characteristics of evolutionary stages of technology and 
then the reasons for their effects on the exchange conditions and governance choice.  
As the first step we dichotomize the general characteristics of technology between emerging and 
mature fields. According to Dosi (1982), a technology field gets mature as a paradigm-setting technology 
emerges. Then, the paradigmatic technology sets a standard in both technological (e.g. how to recognize 
and solve technological problems) and socioeconomic dimensions (e.g. how to use the technology). Once 
the paradigm is set in a field then it will be populated with similar technologies following the same 
technology trajectory. As a result, a technology field that has reached a paradigmatic stage will show the 
following characteristics: 1) the field will be populated with a large number of similar technologies; 2) 
most technologies in the field will address minor technological issues and, therefore, be incremental; 3) 
because of this popularity and incremental nature, the utility and uses of a technology in the field will be 
evaluated with relative ease and accuracy by people working in the field; and finally 4) complementary 
technologies and assets required for using a technology will have been well established. Despite some 
differences in nuance and language, the linkage between the evolutionary stage of technology and its 
characteristics  is  generally  supported  in  the  literature  (Abernathy  and  Clark,  1985;  Anderson  and 
Tushman,  1990;  Tushman  and  Anderson,  1986;  Utterback,  1994).  Fleming  (2001)  and  Fleming  and 
Sorenson (2001) show that the variability in the utility of technologies decreases with the increase in the 
size of the recombinant search  space  of technological components. To summarize, we deduce that a 
technology field populated with more inventions on the same trajectory will be likely to be more familiar 
to people working in the field (and familiar to more people). Hence, inventions in such a field will be 
subject to a lower level of uncertainty, both technological and commercial, and enjoy a broader and faster 
availability of complementary technologies. 
An invention from a familiar technology area, characterized by low technological uncertainty and 
readily available complementary technology, will be more likely than an invention from a less developed 
technology area to be externally commercialized for two reasons. First, the costs for negotiation rise as 
uncertainty increases. When potential applications of a technology are not clearly known at the time of 
contracting, a buyer would worry about overpaying for that technology while the owner would worry 
about underestimation of the value. Moreover, appraising the future value of the technology will also 
incur additional costs of information processing or of building a proper level of capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, uncertainty deters market transactions for such a technology. As for asset 
specificity, suppose an invention in a new field, which has not been integrated into an industry’s products. 
Then, commercializing this invention would require manufacturing and marketing capability specific to 
the invention, and it is most likely that these complementary assets could be developed by those most 




internal  commercialization).  Also,  as  TCE  generally  predicts,  high  asset  specificity  will  increase  the 
hazard of opportunistic behavior and suppress external sourcing of such capabilities (making external 
commercialization risky). In sum, an invention composed of more familiar technological components will 
ease identification of the potential utility and commercial applications and benefit from a larger amount of 
complementary  technologies  needed  for  commercialization  (possibly  from  multiple  vendors).  These 
arguments suggest the following hypothesis. 
H1: A patented invention belonging to a more familiar field of technology will be less likely to be 
internally commercialized. 
 
2.2. Complementary Capabilities 
In  the  markets  for  innovative  products,  possession  of,  or  time  to  build,  complementary 
capabilities is critical for performance and survival of a firm (Mitchell, 1991). Teece (1986) argues that, 
in sourcing complementary assets, an innovator would choose the better strategy between integration 
(internal  commercialization)  and  contract  (external  commercialization)  conditioned  on  how  the 
complementary  assets  are  structured  within  or  across  firm  boundary  and  how  well  the  innovator  is 
positioned  in  the  given  asset  structure.  For  example,  in  the  cable  connector  and  specialty  cable 
manufacturing industry, Argyres (1996) found that capabilities differentials between the manufacturer and 
suppliers  influenced  the  manufacturer’s  outsourcing  decisions.  Similarly,  Leiblein  and  Miller  (2003) 
found that the fabrication experience of integrated circuit manufacturers raised the propensity of vertical 
integration and sourcing experience raised the propensity of outsourcing. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) 
found evidence that the higher the inter-functional communication frequency within a firm, which they 
regarded as difficult-to-imitate specialized assets, the lower the incentives of firms to respond to the 
licensing prospects for the patented innovations. We build on this line of literature to explore how the 
existing production capabilities of a firm affect the firm’s decision regarding the integration of novel 
technology into its production and process. 
We argue that firms integrate, rather than outsource, the production components that are closely 
linked to their existing capabilities based on both capability-based views and transaction costs. Consistent 
with  the  capability-based  logics,  by  integrating  new  technological  components  closely  linked  to  the 
existing production capabilities a firm can readily deploy the existing skills to commercializing the new 
components and, hence, enhance skills-related production efficiency (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). It 
can also utilize existing manufacturing facilities with minimal modification to accommodate the new 
technology, thereby enhancing scale-related production efficiency (Poppo and Zenger, 1998). Firms will 
have  a  higher  incentive  to  internalize  the  technologies  closely  related  to  their  existing  production 




prospect of internal synergy (Conner and Prahalad, 1996) accompanying the internalization process are 
more likely to materialize in their production process.  
Turning our eyes from the production side to the exchange side, we reach the same prediction. 
New technological components closely linked to a firm’s existing production capabilities are likely to 
have more ‘firm-specific’ elements. Exchanging these components in markets is harder than exchanging 
more generic components because transferring ‘firm-specific’ technology to external organizations incurs 
additional costs to the exchange partners (Argyres, 1996). For example, the technology receiver needs to 
expend more effort to assimilate the possible tacit elements originating from the technology creator’s 
production capabilities while the creator may be reluctant to transfer such tacit elements for fear of risking 
its existing competence in production systems. In addition to firm specificity, proximity of a technology 
to a creating firm’s existing production capabilities indicates that the firm may have an advantageous 
position in commanding the complementary assets that are required for utilizing the technology. This 
raises the barrier for market exchange of the technology because a potential receiver (or licensee) may 
fear  possible  ex  post  haggling  by  the  creator  (or  licensor)  based  on  its  advantageous  asset  position. 
Additionally, leveraging its advantageous asset position as a bargaining power (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 
2006) the licensor may impose a more favorable licensing conditions which inject additional frictions in 
the  licensing  deal.  The  above  arguments  suggest  the  following  testable  hypothesis  regarding 
commercialization of patented inventions. 
H2a: A patented invention more strongly coupled with the firm’s existing production capabilities will 
be more likely to be internally commercialized. 
  Both arguments above predict the effects of firm capabilities on integration in a consistent way 
but from different angles - related to production efficiency for capability-based reasoning and exchange 
conditions for TCE. However, there are few studies that have examined the effects of capabilities on 
integration  independently  from  the  exchange  conditions.  This  might  be  ascribed  to  the  fundamental 
confound between production efficiency originated from capabilities with exchange conditions. Indeed, 
some  capability  theorists  argue  that  the  current  firm-specific  capabilities  are  the  result  of  the  past 
boundary decision influenced by exchange conditions (Argyres and Zenger, 2008; Poppo and Zenger, 
1998) and that they co-evolved with the exchange conditions (Jacobides and Winter, 2005). Here, we will 
argue that the effects of capabilities on boundary choice are conditioned on technology familiarity, which 
affects the exchange conditions. Technological innovations have the asset values (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986) which will be differently evaluated by firms conditioned on not only their internal utility and 
fitness  but  also  availability  of  comparative  external  options.  There  are  competing  arguments  in  the 
literature regarding this aspect. Zelner (2009) found that the higher demand uncertainty, the higher the 




that an invention belongs to a very familiar technology area and, hence, technological uncertainty is low. 
In this case, even if an invention contains firm-specific elements in it, it would not raise the transaction 
costs as much as it does for a less familiar technology because buyers of the technology will know more 
about the technology. Therefore, the additional transaction costs and bargaining power stemming from 
firm  specificity  will  have  a  relatively  smaller  impact  on  the  boundary  decision.  Moreover,  internal 
learning opportunities from the familiar technology will be smaller than from an unfamiliar technology, 
which reduces incentives for integration of familiar technology even if it is closely linked to existing 
capabilities.  On the other hand, the impacts of skills-related or scale-related production efficiency on 
boundary  decisions  will  be  invariant  over  changes  in  uncertainty  condition.  Here,  both  TCE  and 
capabilities  arguments  again  predict  in  the  same  direction,  which  we  formulate  as  the  following 
hypothesis. 
H2b:  The  more  familiar  the  technology  environment,  the  smaller  the  impact  of  an  invention’s 
coupling with existing firm capabilities on the propensity of internal commercialization.  
 
2.3. Inter-organizational ties 
Inter-organizational ties are important conduits for information flows (related to both market and 
technological opportunities), as well as vehicles for creating trust, which may affect the relative benefits 
and costs of external versus internal commercialization. In this paper, we will focus on a particular inter-
organizational tie, collaboration during the R&D process (or inventive collaboration), and then show its 
impact  on  the  governance  choice  for  commercialization.  We  start  by  discussing  how  inventive 
collaboration forms embedded ties, then draw from the literature their key characteristics relevant to 
governance choice, and argue how these characteristics affect governance choice. 
Inventions are usually an outcome of combining diverse problem-solving capabilities and, thus, 
often  benefit  from  information  sharing  among  people  having  expertise  in  various  technologies  and 
instruments (Arthur, 2007). When a firm lacks some of these capabilities, it sources them from outside. 
Because those capabilities usually include tacit and firm-specific elements (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Powell,  1990),  transferring  them  from  one  entity  to  another  requires  repeated  interactions  and 
communications, which results in collaboration, either formal or informal.  Through the repeated joint 
problem-solving and information sharing activities, collaboration partners naturally build up trust and 
relational inertia which turn into embedded ties (McEvily and Marcus, 2005). Inter-firm embedded ties 
formed as such influence future economic exchanges (Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1996) and, 
thanks to greater trust and shared information among tie partners, reduce the risks of opportunism and the 




Drawing from the literature, we identify three key elements of inter-firm embedded ties that may 
affect the governance choice of a tie partner: relational inertia, knowledge (especially about capabilities) 
and trust. To begin, we expect that routines and relationships built up during the invention collaboration 
are likely to persist into the commercialization phase of the project. Once the investment in an inter-
organizational tie has been made, firms are likely to continue to work with the same partner unless there 
is strong reason to change. In other words, there is significant inertia in inter-organizational relationships 
(Stinchcombe, 1990). For example, empirical studies about alliance and organizational learning suggest 
that ties formed during the explorative stage of innovation are likely to be maintained in exploitative stage 
(Powell et al., 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). 
Inter-firm  ties  are  also  an  important  channel  for  knowledge  transfer  in  innovative  activities 
(Afuah, 2000; Mowery et al., 1996; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Powell et al., 1996; von Hippel, 
1988). Benefits from participating in the knowledge exchange ties are multifold to the participants. First 
of all, they can acquire particular problem-solving know-how. In addition, through access to a larger pool 
of technological elements provided by tie partners, they can see and grasp technological opportunities in a 
more timely and accurate manner (Fleming, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Exchange of either problem-
solving know-how or technological opportunities, then, enhances the overall quality of inventions and 
strengthens  the  absorptive  capacity  of  tie  participants  (Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1990).  Knowledge 
transferred over inter-firm ties also includes market and demand opportunities (Achrol, 1997; Podolny 
and Page, 1998; Stuart et al., 1999). Through exchange of knowledge about market and demand, tie 
partners  can  better  understand  and  evaluate  the  market  potential  of  a  technology  and  may  discover 
unforeseen opportunities attached to the technology. Finally, knowledge exchanged between collaborators 
during  the  invention  process  may  include  fine-grained  information  on  partner  (or  even  third  party) 
capabilities and commercialization strategies, which may be key for developing licensing opportunities 
for commercializing the technology.  For example, during technology development, the focal firm may be 
concentrating on one application, for which it has in-house capabilities, but learn that its partner (or 
another firm) has an idea for a high-value use that requires different capabilities that the focal firm does 
not possess, but the other firm does, suggesting the opportunity to license the technology for greater 
return. 
The effects of inter-firm ties on governance choice are likely to differ depending on whether the 
collaboration  with  a  partner  along  the  value  chain,  such  as  suppliers  or  customers  (or  vertical 
collaboration), versus collaboration with partners across the value chain, such as competitors or firms in 
the same industry (or horizontal collaboration). For example, production capabilities and resources are 
likely to be more complementary and mutually dependent between firms in a vertical relationship than in 




vertical collaboration is more likely than in a horizontal collaboration to have complementary, local, 
contextual, or product-specific elements (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; von Hippel, 1988) and to be targeted 
to  commercial  application  (Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1989,  1990).  Consequently,  inventions  developed 
through  vertical  collaboration  will  have  incorporated  more  product-specific  and  firm-specific 
technological  elements  than  inventions  developed  through  horizontal  collaboration.  Thus,  inventions 
developed through vertical collaboration will be more likely than through horizontal collaboration to be 
internally commercialized because of higher gains from learning opportunities, skills-related production 
efficiency, and the prospect of internal synergy on one hand, and, on the other hand, higher costs of 
transferring such technologies to the third party who has not joined the vertical collaboration.  
In  addition  to  inertia  and  knowledge  exchange,  inter-organizational  collaboration  during  the 
invention stage should build trust between partners, which lowers the opportunism hazards, and therefore 
increases the propensity for external commercialization (see below). At the same time, inter-firm ties 
transfer knowledge and information in both directions between the focal firm and the tie partner. Thus, 
not only the focal firm but also the collaboration partner will have developed technological and market 
capabilities through collaboration, leading to spillovers and possibly a loss of lead time advantage for the 
focal firm. The partner may then be in a strong position to incorporate the invention (or closely related 
technologies) into its own innovation.  This may or may not be a violation of the trust built up in the R&D 
collaboration, depending on the nature of the spillovers. In fact, such sharing of the rents may have been 
part of the initial expectations of the collaboration.  This scenario would also predict a high rate of out-
licensing of inventions built on R&D collaboration, either as a continuation of the relationship already 
developed (and hence, reinforcing the inertia and trust), or as a result of rent dissipation, leaving the focal 
firm with the second best option (after exclusive use) of licensing, perhaps broadly, to capture some 
returns from the invention. If this spillover and rent dissipation effect is strong, then we would likely find 
higher licensing for inventions growing out of horizontal collaborations. In addition, we may find these 
horizontal  collaborations  result  in  multiple  licensees,  suggesting  that,  in  the  face  of  spillovers  that 
dissipate the rents from exclusivity, the focal firm is capitalizing on its invention by licensing broadly 
(Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora et al., 2001).  
Based  on  these  arguments,  we  suggest  that  inter-organizational  ties  in  the  form  of  R&D 
collaboration are likely to generate inertia, information flows and trust that will increase the rates of 
external commercialization.  Furthermore, the rent dissipation argument tied to spillovers also suggests 
that licensing should be higher for horizontal collaborations. On the other hand, for vertical collaborations, 
because of the countervailing effects of the ability to exploit complementary capabilities and the lower 
likelihood of rent dissipation, we do not have a clear prediction on the net effect on internal versus 




H3: A patented invention developed through collaboration with firms in horizontal relationships 
will be more likely to be externally commercialized than inventions developed without such collaboration. 
 
2.4. Embeddedness, Uncertainty and External Commercialization  
In addition to the direct effects of trust on increased licensing mentioned above, prior work also 
suggests  that  inter-organizational  ties  may  be  important  for  reducing  the  risk  of  opportunism  in 
transactions (Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1997).  Following Granovetter (1985), Stinchcombe 
(1990) and Uzzi (1997), we will focus on the embeddedness of dyadic ties that comes from ongoing 
interactions,  and  is  associated  with  fine  grained  information  transfer,  joint  problem  solving,  and 
development  of  trust.    In  addition  to  dyadic  embeddedness,  prior  work  has  also  highlighted  the 
importance  of  structural  embeddedness  as  an  additional  mechanism  that  may  reduce  the  risks  of 
opportunism due to the existence of shared alters that can sanction malfeasance (Coleman, 1988; Jones et 
al., 1997b). While structural embeddedness is also potentially important, in the context of inter-firm ties, 
especially R&D collaboration and licensing of inventions (both of which often involve secrecy), dyadic 
relationships are likely to dominate, and we will focus on this meaning of embedded tie.  
Prior  work  suggests  that  embedded  ties  can  serve  as  alternative  governance  mechanisms  in 
between markets and hierarchies (Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1997).  In the context of innovation, we argue that 
successful R&D cooperation  is likely  to result in an  embedded relationship, such that the two  firms 
involved begin to develop greater trust, greater orientation to join problem solving, and expectations of 
future relationships that get incorporated into the decision making process.  This embeddedness should 
lead  to  reduced  fears  of  opportunism  by  the  partners,  and  can  provide  a  supplemental  governance 
structure that can help overcome some of the limitation to contracting in the face of high uncertainty and a 
dependence on relation-specific assets under the control of the partner (Uzzi, 1997; Williamson, 1985). 
Inter-organizational trust is, as defined by Dyer and Chu (2000), “one party's confidence that the other 
party in the exchange relationship will not exploit its vulnerabilities.”  Thus, while high technological 
uncertainty is likely to dampen licensing as discussed above, this effect is likely to be mitigated if the 
partners have a strong prior relationship, such as a successful joint R&D project, suggesting the following 
hypothesis: 
H4:  The  more  unfamiliar  the  technology,  the  stronger  the  positive  effects  of  horizontal 








3.  Data and Measures 
 
3.1. Data 
In  order to test  these hypotheses, we constructed  a  novel data  set from  multiple sources: an 
inventor survey, the United States Patent and Trademark Office online database, the European Patent 
Office  Worldwide  Patent  Statistical  Database  (henceforth,  PATSTAT),  and  COMPUSTAT  for  firm 
financial  information.  The  ‘U.S.  Inventor  Survey  2007’  was  conducted  in  the  summer  of  2007.  The 
population for the survey is the of OECD triadic patent families
1 compiled and provided by the OECD in 
January  2007  (OECD,  2006).  We  use  triadic  patents  as  our  sampling  frame  to  facilitate  survey 
administration
2 and enhance cross-national comparability. In addition, by focusing on triadicly patented 
inventions, we have a greater chance of having commercialized inventions in our sample (since filing in 
three jurisdictions acts as a threshold screen that eliminates many low value patents). Since our focus is 
on the mode of commercialization, this lets us concentrate our data collection effort on inventions that are 
more likely to be commercialized at all. 
The OECD triadic patent database identifies 84,021 triadic patent families whose priority patent 
was filed between year 2000 and 2003, inclusive. Our population is the 32,390 triadic patent families that 
had at least one inventor with a U.S. address. Because some patent families are associated with multiple 
U.S.  patents,  our  population  includes  74,705  different  U.S.  patents.  For  comparison,  about  40%  of 
priority year 2000 U.S. patents were also triadic patents. We drew a systematic sample of 9,060 triadic 
patent families with at least one U.S.-addressed inventor, stratified by NBER technology class. Taking the 
first available US inventor from the first granted U.S. patent in each family as the representative inventor, 
and after randomly drawing one patent for inventors with multiple patents in our sample, we have 7933 
unique U.S.-based inventors in our mail-out sample. To identify duplicate inventors, we used name and 
home address. For the small number of inventors having the same name but different home addresses, we 
examined identified individuals by using their assignee and co-inventors (see Lai et al., 2009). After 
sending the survey packet (with first-class stamps and individualized, signed cover letters), follow-up 
letters  and  a  second-wave  mailing  of  the  full  packet,  we  received  1919  responses  (24.2%).  After 
excluding undeliverables, deceased, etc., from the denominator, we have an adjusted response rate of 
31.8%. We excluded 113 patents not associated with firms (including, but not limited to, independent 
inventors and university patents), based on a survey question asking about the organization to which an 
                                                   
1 Triadic patents are equivalent patents granted in the USPTO and filed in both the European Patent Office and the 
Japan Patent Office. 




inventor belonged at the time of invention. For the small number of patents missing on this question, we 
sorted  out  non-firm  patents  by  looking  at  assignee  fields.  After  further  removing  580  observations 
missing on our variables, we are left with 1226 patents associated with firms, including both public and 
private firms, large and small firms, and inventions from across the USPTO technology sectors. For our 
main analyses, we limit the sample to the 651 commercially used patents.  
While large firms may be better positioned to file globally, a detailed comparison of the firms in 
our sample shows that the firm size distribution in our sample is not significantly different from the 
underlying population of innovating firms (Jung, 2009). In particular, there are a substantial number of 
small and medium firms in our sample (about 18% of the sample of patents come from firms with less 
than  500  employees).  However,  we  should  note  that  not  all  inventions  are  patented, and  that  patent 
propensities vary by industry, so that we should be careful when making inferences from this population 
of inventions (Cohen et al., 2000). Still, this population represents a significant subset of inventions, and 
is  likely  to  especially  represent  those  inventions  with  a  high-risk  for  global  commercialization  (cf. 
Gambardella et al., 2008; Harhoff et al., 1999). Also, patenting is often considered a pre-condition for 
licensing of technology (although this is not always the case and software is a major exception).  Thus, if 
we  are  interested in the choice  between  in-house  use and  licensing,  limiting our  sample  to  patented 
inventions may help increase the comparability of the inventions in the two choices.
3 
In order to test for response bias, we conducted a series of unequal variance t-tests for the mean 
values of some key patent indicators between the analysis sample (n=1226) and the rest of the survey 
population (N=9060-1226). We did not find significant differences between the two groups. In particular, 
measures of collaboration (solo inventions: 26.3% for the analysis sample, 26.8% for the rest, p=0.69; 
average number of inventors: 2.80 for the analysis sample, 2.74 for the rest, p=0.34), the technological 
breadth of invention (the number of different US Patent Classes: 4.44 for the analysis sample, 4.61 for the 
rest, p=0.14; the number of different International Patent Classes: 4.77 for the analysis sample, 4.85 for 
the rest, p=0.44), the scope of invention (the number of claims: 3.44 for the analysis sample, 3.59 for the 
rest, p=0.06) and measures of patent value (Log(forward citations), 0.97 for the analysis sample, 0.99 for 
the rest, p=0.43) are all similar (none are significantly different at p<0.05, N=9060). 
4 In conclusion, 
                                                   
3 Of course, patenting is partially endogenous to the expected mode of commercialization, so this is one limitation of 
this sample. 
4 We found statistically significant differences for only two variables, which we do not see as significantly affecting 
the sample. The analysis sample includes a somewhat smaller number of patents for which we only had a company 
address, instead of the home address (4.2% of the analysis sample had only a company address v. 5.8% for the rest, 
p<.01). The linkage to universities or science is also somewhat lower in our sample than the survey population as 
indicated by lower mean of the number of “Non-patent References” in the patents, which often includes references 




despite  the  modest  response  rate,  we  have  some  confidence  that  our  sample is  representative  of  the 
underlying population of US-based triadic patents. 
 
3.2. Variables and Measures 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable—Modes of Commercialization 
The U.S. Inventor Survey 2007 asks inventors about commercial use and the reasons for nonuse 
of  their  patented  inventions.  We  identify  a  patented  invention  as  commercially  exploited  if  it  is  1) 
commercialized in a product/process/service by the applicant or owner of the patent, 2) licensed out or put 
in  a  cross-license  deal  by  (one  of)  the  patent-holder(s)  to  an  independent  party,  or  3)  commercially 
exploited by the respondent or any co-inventor for starting a new company. Out of 1,226 complete cases, 
651  (53.1%)  patents  were  reported  as  being  commercialized.  The  dependent  variable  Internal 
commercialization  is  coded  1  for  those  observations  reporting  that  a  patent  is  “commercialized  in  a 
product/process/service by the applicant or owner of the patent” but not licensed (including cross-license) 
nor commercially exploited by the respondent or any co-inventor for starting a new company. Note that 
the sample is limited to the responses in which the respondent belonged to firms at the time of invention. 
This limiting condition removes university start-ups from the sample. Among the patents in commercial 
use, 74% were used purely internally. The rest of the commercialized patents are regarded as “external 
commercialization.” Out of 169 patents thus identified as “external commercialization,” 113 patents were 
also used internally. We classify these dual-use patents as “external use” for two reasons. First, it is 
possible  that  some  respondents  misinterpreted  the  internal  use  question  and  answered  “yes”  if  the 
company’s use of the invention was to license it (an overly broad understanding of internal use). Second, 
these dual-use inventions, which likely share some traits with internal use and other traits with external 
use, would blur the distinctions between the two modes and thereby produce conservative tests of our 
predictions  about  the  differences  between  internal  and  external  use.  We  discuss  the  different 
specifications of the dependent variable in more detail below.  
3.2.2. Explanatory Variables 
 We  operationalize  technological  familiarity  using  a  familiarity  index  of  technological 
components based on Fleming (2001). The component familiarity index captures the degree to which a 
patentee is familiar with the technological components that were used in his patent. As a technology 
matures  (and,  therefore, the population  of  technological  artifacts  increases), technological  trajectories 
                                                                                                                                                                    
university linkage of our analysis sample should be somewhat lower because we removed from our analysis sample 




based  on  this  technology  become  more  foreseeable  and  less  uncertain  (Dosi,  1982).  The  individual 
component familiarity for patent i is calculated as follows,  
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where  i C = ,  j c = patent subclass identifier, and 
i C N = number of different patent subclasses assigned to 
patent i. We depreciate old knowledge by applying a knowledge attenuation factor kattenuationk= Exp [-
(temporal distance of patent k / time constant of knowledge loss)] where temporal distance of patent k is 
set to 4.5 if patent k was filed from 1995 to 1999; 9.5 if it was filed from 1990 to 1994; and 18.5 if it was 
filed from 1976 to 1989. The temporal distance is calculated by subtracting the median issue year of 
patents over the given period from the median filing year of the focal patent in our sample (=2001.5). The 
time constant of knowledge loss is set to 5 years, following Fleming (2001). We rescaled component 
familiarity by dividing it by 1000. 
We  measure  the  strength  of  the  link  between  a  patented  invention  and  the  firm’s  existing 
production capabilities using two survey measures: 1) whether an inventor belonged to the manufacturing 
unit and 2) whether the goal of the invention was to create a new product or process (“new-to-the-firm 
invention”) or to improve existing products or processes. An inventor belonging to the manufacturing unit 
is  assumed  to  be  more  knowledgeable  about  the  firms’  manufacturing  processes  and  capabilities,  to 
maintain stronger ties with technicians working on manufacturing lines, and to be more able to couple the 
invention with the internally available co-specialized assets. The variable Manufacturing unit is coded 1 if 
the inventor belongs to the manufacturing unit and 0 for the R&D unit, software development, sales & 
marketing, or others. The second measure, Improvement, was coded 1 if the innovation was to improve an 
existing process or product and 0 if the innovation was to create a new process or product. Here, we are 
assuming  that  new-to-the-firm  inventions  are  more  detached  from  the  existing  capabilities  than  are 
improvement inventions, which  are likely  to  be  closely  linked to  existing  capabilities  (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). 
Finally, we measure inter-firm ties by using collaboration during the invention process.  While 
this  is  only  one  form  of  inter-organizational  tie,  this  measure  captures  an  important  dimension  of 
knowledge sharing and trust between firms (since cooperating during the R&D stage of innovation often 
requires sharing important technical and strategic information). We measure invention collaboration using 
the  questions  asking  about  presence  of  external  co-inventors  or  collaborators.  The  survey  asked 
respondents to report how many inventors came from the respondents own firm and how many came from 




non-competitors within the same industry, other firms, universities, government research organizations, 
hospitals, and other. We also asked respondents if, during the research process that led to the patented 
invention, their firm had any formal or informal collaborations with other organizations (excluding co-
inventors).  We  take  the  union  of  these  two  measures  as  our  measure  of  inter-organizational  R&D 
collaboration. The binary variable Horizontal collaboration is coded 1 for co-invention or collaboration 
with  competitors,  non-competitors  within  the  same  industry,  or  other  firms.  We  also  control  for 
collaboration with firms in a vertical relationship or with public organizations by including the variables, 
Vertical collaboration, which is coded 1 for co-invention or collaboration with suppliers or customers and 
0  otherwise,  and  Public  collaboration,  which  is  coded  1  for  co-invention  or  collaboration  with 
universities, government research organizations, or hospitals and 0 otherwise. About 31% of horizontal 
collaboration is with competitors and about 68% of vertical collaboration with suppliers. This grouping of 
collaboration types into horizontal, vertical and public reflects the latent factor structure as based on an 
exploratory  factor  analysis  using  tetrachoric  correlations,  as  well  as  our  theoretical  priors  about  the 
distinctiveness of vertical versus horizontal collaborations (discussed above). 
3.2.3. Controls 
We control for two firm-level factors: firm size and firm patent stock. Size is known to be an 
important factor determining a firm’s propensity to license (Gambardella et al., 2007). Using the survey 
and complementary data sources such as COMPUSTAT, the Patent Fee Maintenance Database of the 
USPTO, and company websites, we coded the variable Large firm as 1 if the inventor belonged to a large 
firm (defined as having more than 500 employees) at the time of invention and 0 otherwise.  As a check 
on the reliability of our survey responses, we find a 92% agreement between the self-reported Large firm 
measure and the size data in COMPUSTAT, and an 86% agreement between the self-reported Large firm 
measure and the USPTO small entity designation. The COMPUSTAT and USPTO measures have a 97% 
rate of agreement, suggesting that these measures also have some measurement error. We control for the 
technological capabilities of firms using the logarithm of firm patent stock, Ln(patent stock), as a proxy. 
We define patent stock as the sum of U.S. patents granted to the first assignee of the focal patent. The 
patent  stock  of  firm  i  for  a  focal  patent  filed  in  year  t  is  PSit=PSi  (t-1)(1-d)  where  d  represents  the 
knowledge depreciation constant, which is set to 15%, following previous studies (Grimpe and Hussinger, 
2008;  Hall,  1990).  We  collected  the  data  from  the  PATSTAT  database  (April  2008  version)  and 
consolidated the patent stock  of subsidiary  firms into the count of  their ultimate parents and that of 
merged and acquired firms into the mergers.  
In addition to firm-level controls, we control for many invention and patent level factors that are 
likely to affect the probability of licensing versus in-house use. At the invention level, we control for the 




various knowledge sources were for: 1) suggesting the project and 2) contributing to the completion of the 
project (two items). The measure is a 6-point scale with 0 for “did not use,” 1 for “not important,” and 5 
for “very important.” For each source of knowledge we took the maximum value of the scores for the 
suggestion and completion questions and then constructed a normalized mean score. Industrial knowledge 
is the mean score on the following five knowledge sources: patent literature, fair or exhibition, standards 
documents,  customers and  product  users,  suppliers, and  competitors  (Cronbach’s  alpha=0.66). Public 
knowledge  is  the  mean  of  the  following  four  knowledge  sources:  scientific  literature,  technical 
conferences, universities, and government research organizations (Cronbach’s alpha=0.69). This grouping 
is  also  empirically  reasonable  as  indicated  by  a  confirmatory  factor  analysis  (Chi-square  pr.>  0.15; 
NFI=0.99;  GFI=1.00). We  also  control  for  the  project  goal.  The  survey  asked  if  the  purpose  of  the 
research  was  “enhancing  the  technology  base  of  the  firm  or the  long-term  cultivation  of  technology 
seeds” (in contrast to creating a new line of business or enhancing an existing business). The variable No 
immediate demand is coded 1 if the goal was to enhance the technology base and 0 otherwise. We also 
control for the proportion of the inventor’s time spent on basic research (% basic R&D), based on the 
survey response. The technological value of the invention (Technological value) is controlled using the 
inventor’s self-assessment of the valuation following recent work on valuing patents (Gambardella et al., 
2008). In our survey, we asked the inventor to assess the technical significance of her invention relative to 
other technical developments in her field during the year the focal patent was applied for. We code 4 for 
top 10%, 3 for top 25% (but not top 10%), 2 for top 50% (but not top 25%), and 1 for bottom half. We 
control the resources invested in the invention using two different measures. The variable man-months is 
an ordinal variable constructed from the survey question asking “[a]pproximately how many man-months 
did the research leading to the focal patent require?” The answer categories were: less than one man-
month; 1-3 man-months; 4-6; 7-12; 13-24; 25-48; 49-72; 73-96; and more than 97 man-months. The top 
category was set to 108.5. We then used normalized median values (dividing each group median by the 
top category median) as the measure of relative project size. We also control for the number of inventors, 
based on the U.S. patent publication. Because product and process innovation differ in the likelihood of 
licensing, as well as other important dimensions (Cohen et al., 2000), we asked if the invention is a 
product, process or mixed invention (with Product invention equal to 1 if it is product and 0 if it is 
process or mixed). We control for the breadth of the patent using two proxy measures: the number of 
different  technology  classes  and  the  number  of  claims.  The  number  of  different  technology  classes 
(Complexity of technology) can be regarded as a measure of the strength of the patent (Gambardella et al., 
2007), complexity of technology, or scope of invention (Nerkar and Shane, 2007). We used the U.S. 
Patent Class (USPC) as assigned and organized by the USPTO. We also use total number of claims as a 




affected by how much time the firm has had to exploit the invention (either internally or externally). The 
variable Age of invention measures how many months have elapsed from invention filing to the time of 
the survey. We also control for technology area. We distinguish six different technology areas using the 
OST/INPI/ISI nomenclature (OECD, 1994). Descriptions and summary statistics for the variables are 
presented in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, about 74% of commercialized inventions are used internally 
and that about 10% were by inventors in the manufacturing unit.  We see that 43% of inventions were 
improvements to existing products or processes.  Finally, we find that 7.5% of commercialized inventions 
involved horizontal collaboration, 27% involved vertical collaboration and 7% involved collaboration 
with public organizations.   
<Insert Table 1 here> 
When we compare across technology areas, we find that the rate of internal commercialization is highest 
in mechanical engineering and machinery (with almost 90% of commercialized inventions used in-house). 
In contrast, licensing is highest in chemicals and pharmaceuticals, with over 30% of commercialized 
inventions used externally (cf. Arora, et al., 2001). The rate of horizontal collaboration is highest in 
consumer goods & construction (16%), followed by mechanical engineering (10.4%).  
 
4.  Results 
We  used  probit  regressions  (internal  versus  external  commercialization)  to  test  the  effects  of 
technology  familiarity,  links  to  firm  capabilities  and  inter-firm  ties  on  the  probability  of  in-house 
commercialization (Table 2). For these regression we restricted the sample to commercially used patents 
(N=651). Model 1 is the baseline model, showing with only controls: importance of knowledge from 
firms and from public sources, being in a large firm, patent stock, patent value, no immediate demand, 
percent basic, product invention, project size, patent breadth, invention age and technology class. Models 
2  and  3  include  our  explanatory  variables,  familiarity,  ties  to  capabilities,  and  horizontal  ties,  with 
alternate measures  of the invention’s coupling  with existing  capabilities  (improvement invention  and 
manufacturing unit, respectively). In models 4 and 5 we add interaction terms between familiarity and our 
measures of links to capabilities, and between familiarity and horizontal inter-organizational ties. The 
right two columns in the table show the marginal effects of model 5 for a representative large firm and a 
representative small firm (with all other variables set to their mean or mode). All models are significant (p 
< 0.001) with adjusted pseudo-R-squares ranging from 0.114 for the base model to 0.140 for Model 5. We 
discuss  possible  sources  of  bias  of  these  specifications  and  present  the  results  from  alternative 
specifications later in this section. 





4.1. Hypotheses Tests 
Our  first  hypothesis  suggests  that  Component  familiarity  should  be  associated  with  more 
licensing (and hence lower rates of purely internal use). We find a negative and significant effect of 
familiarity on internal commercialization, suggesting that firms are more likely to license technologies as 
the technology domain becomes more populated with similar inventions. This effect is significant after 
controlling for knowledge spillovers from public sources, including patent literature. Thus, technological 
familiarity  (and  maturity  of  technology)  has  an  impact  on  the  commercialization  process  net  of 
knowledge spillovers during the invention process. Even when we add the interaction effects, the effect of 
familiarity  is  consistently  negative  and  generally  significant  (p<.10).  In  the  model  with  the 
familiarity*improvement interaction term, the effect is not quite significant (model 4). We also find that 
inventions  strongly  coupled  with  the  firm’s  existing  capabilities  are  more  likely  to  be  internally 
commercialized, supporting H2a.  For both measures, Manufacturing unit and Improvement, we find a 
significant positive effect, even in the model with interaction effects.  Finally, we can see that Horizontal 
collaboration is associated with lower rates of internal use (higher licensing), consistent with H3. To help 
specify the mechanism that might drive the effects of horizontal collaboration, we checked to see if 
horizontal collaboration is associated with greater rent dissipation through spillovers.  As argued above, if 
the R&D collaboration results in spillovers that reduce the focal firm’s exclusivity, they may be more 
willing to license to multiple firms (because they have already suffered from a significant rent dissipation, 
and so can use the license to try to capture some returns to their investment).  The survey asked, for those 
inventions  that  were  licensed,  how  many  different  firms  they  licensed  to.    We  compare  the  rate  of 
multiple licensees between those who had a horizontal collaboration versus those that did not.  We find 
that the rate of multiple licensees is higher (although not quite statistically significant at conventional 
levels) for those with a horizontal collaboration compared to other collaborations (44% v. 23%, Pearson 
chi2(1)  =    2.24    P<  0.15),  consistent  with  a  spillover/rent  dissipation  explanation  for  external 
commercialization.  However, since we do not know the number of collaborating firms, we cannot rule 
out that the number of partners differs between horizontal and other collaborations. We also see from the 
correlation  table  that  there  is  a  significant,  but  modest  (r=.10),  correlation  between  horizontal 
collaboration and knowledge flows from firms.  This result, combined with the fact that the effect of 
horizontal collaboration  is  significant  net  of  knowledge  flows,  suggests that  fine-grained  information 
transfer  may  not  be the  main  driver of  the  external  commercialization  effect.   Thus,  we  have  some 
evidence for spillovers/rent dissipation and for fine-grained information transfer as possible mechanisms.  
We could not test inertia or trust directly. 
The last two columns in Table 2 give the effects sizes, both for a large firm and for a small firm 




increases by 1 (or as there are about an additional 1000 knowledge-loss-depreciated patents in the same 
technology  field  as  the  invention)  the  probability  of  internal  commercialization  decreases  by  17.3 
percentage points for a patent from a large firm and by 23.5 percentage points for a patent from a small 
firm, holding other variables constant at their means or modes. The effects for links to firm capabilities 
are  also  substantial.  A  manufacturing  unit  invention  has  a  14.6  point  higher  probability  of  internal 
commercialization for large firms and a 25.2 point higher probability for small firms. Finally, horizontal 
collaboration lowers the probability of internal commercialization by 18.8 percentage points for a large 
firm and 21.2 percentage points for a small firm.  
To  test  hypotheses  2b  and  4,  we  added  the  interaction  terms  Component  familiarity  * 
Manufacturing unit in models 3 and 5, Component familiarity * Improvement in models 2 and 4, and 
Component  familiarity  *  Horizontal  collaboration  in  models  4  and  5.  Although  coefficients  for  the 
interaction  terms  are  not  significant,  this  does  not  tell  us  that  there  are  no  interaction  effects.  In  a 
nonlinear model, the sign, magnitude, and significance of the coefficients on interaction terms vary with 
the covariates (Ai and Norton, 2003; Hoetker, 2007; Zelner, 2009). Thus, we examined the interaction 
effects  conditional  on  the  covariates  using  two  different  methods:  1)  computational  calculation,  as 
suggested by Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004)  and 2) simulation-based calculations developed by King et al. 
(Tomz et al., 2003). We obtained consistent results from both methods and, thus, report only the analysis 
from the latter. Figure 1 presents two plots: panel (a) shows the predicted probabilities for manufacturing 
unit  (dashed  line)  and  for  non-manufacturing  unit  (solid  line)  inventions  and  panel  (b)  shows  their 
difference (line) and 95% confidence intervals (shade), which we computed from 651 sets of simulated 
coefficients from a multivariate normal distribution whose mean and variance are equal to the estimated 
coefficient vector and the estimated variance-covariance matrix, following Tomz et al. (2003) and Zelner 
(2009). All the probabilities and the interaction effects are calculated for a representative large firm, as we 
used above for calculating marginal effects in Table 2 (based on model 5). In order to more easily see the 
effects, we focus on the lower range for Component familiarity (0 to .25, which covers 95% of data 
points). Figure 1 gives the results for the interaction of familiarity and capabilities. As we expected, based 
on  TCE,  the  effects  of  existing  capabilities  on  internal  commercialization  decrease  as  technology 
familiarity  increases  (panel  (a)).  The  difference  in  the  predicted  probabilities  between  high  and  low 
capabilities linkages (manufacturing inventions or not) is only significantly different from (and higher 
than)  zero  when  technological  familiarity  is  low,  consistent  with  H2b.  However,  as  indicated  by 
overlapping shadows between the low (around 0.03) and the medium level (around 0.07) of Component 
familiarity,  the  difference  is  not  significantly  larger  at  lower  familiarity  than  at  higher  familiarity. 
Therefore,  we  can  only  say  from  our  estimation  that  the  impacts  of  existing  capabilities  on  the 




not continuous and for much of the range the effects appear not to be statistically significant, providing 
limited support to H2b.  
We also hypothesized that the effects of uncertainty may be lower when the invention was based 
on horizontal ties. Figure 2 shows similar plots for the interaction Component familiarity * Horizontal 
collaboration.  Horizontal  collaboration  is  associated  with  a  lower  probability  of  internal 
commercialization  (panel  (a)).  However,  the  gap  seems  to  be  narrower  (rather  than  larger)  when 
familiarity is low (in other words, in the range where TCE would predict licensing is difficult). When we 
look at panel (b), the predicted differences in probabilities are negative and statistically significant at 
lower levels of Component familiarity (below 0.16), and the gap increases (rather than decreases) as 
familiarity increases, although the standard errors also increase. Thus, we do not find evidence to support 
H4. Instead, we find some evidence that the effects of R&D collaboration on commercialization mode are 
strongest when technology is familiar enough to support bargaining, at which point inter-firm ties can 
help reduce opportunism in technology contracting.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
4.2. Other effects 
Our estimates show strong and consistent results that patents from large firms are more likely to 
be internally commercialized. The coefficients on “large firm” are highly significant and positive across 
the  models  (p  <0.01),  consistent  with  findings  from  European  data  (Gambardella  et  al.,  2007).  Our 
measures of patent breadth (Number of claims and Complexity of technology) do not have a significant 
impact on commercialization mode, which is different from what Gambardella et al. (2007) found from 
the PatVal-EU survey. However, some of this difference may be due to differences across patent systems 
in claims writing and the assignment of patent classes to inventions. We find that when knowledge in the 
patent builds heavily on information from other firms, it is more likely to be used internally, while when 
it builds on public knowledge, it is more likely to be licensed, perhaps reflecting the tacit v. codified 
knowledge  distinction.  In  contrast  to  Kim  and  Vonortas  (2006),  our  estimation  does  not  show  a 
significant relationship between the patent stock of a firm and the propensity to commercialize externally 
(which includes licensing). 
We found no significant impact of patent breadth on the governance choice of commercialization. 
This is probably because of multiple meaning attached to the measures. As Gambardella et al. claimed, as 
technological scope and complexity increase, the possibility of inventing-around will decrease; thus, the 
protective role of the patent will be strengthened (and therefore licensing should increase). This is one 




transaction costs (and therefore licensing should decrease). These multiple connotations from the same 
measure work in the opposite directions with regard to the commercialization mode, which may explain 
the null result.  
 
4.3. Robustness Checks 
4.3.1. Alternative specifications 
The tests above use a data set comprising commercially used patents. These specifications may 
result in biased estimates of the coefficients if the presence of the third alternative (i.e., nonuse) affects 
the choice between internal and external commercialization or if factors affecting the censoring procedure 
(i.e., nonuse) are not independent from the factors affecting commercial use (“selection effects”). To test 
if  our  main  estimations  are  subject  to  these  biases,  we  examined  two  additional  specifications: 
multinomial logistic regression and the Heckman probit selection model. We also discuss the possibility 
of bias from omitted observations. However, we do not find any evidence in these robustness checks that 
invalidate our main specifications (tables available from the contact author). 
For the multinomial logistic regression analysis, we created a nominal variable “mode of use” by 
coding 0 for nonuse, 1 for internal use, and 2 for external use. We did not distinguish between “licensed” 
and  “for  a  new  firm”  because  of  the  small  number  of  observations  assigned  to  each  of  these  two 
categories. We ran a multinomial logistic regression with “internal use” as the comparison group. Our 
multinomial logistic model is proper: the Small-Hsiao tests of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) assumption indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that omission of nonuse is irrelevant to 
the choice between internal and external use at a 5% significance level. The multinomial logit model is 
said to be proper when the outcomes are distinct and not substitutes for one another (Long and Freese, 
2006). In our model, the modes of use are distinct, as shown by the results of Wald and Likelihood Ratio 
tests for combining alternatives. However, they may be substitutes for one another. The probability of 
mode choice when every patent is forced into use may be different from the probability when nonuse is 
allowed. For example, if a bargaining failure view of strategic nonuse (Merges, 1994) is valid, then 
adding  or  removing  a  choice  for  strategic  nonuse  will  affect  more  on  licensing  than  other  choices. 
Another complexity of interpretation stems from the way we classify the modes of use. We assign those 
patents in dual use (both internal and external use) to external use. Theoretically, those dual-use patents 
should have characteristics of both internal and external use and possibly make our interpretation more 
complex. However, at least empirically, it seems that the characteristics of dual-use patents are more 
overlapped with the characteristics of external use. We test the distinctiveness of dual use from purely 
external use using multinomial logistic regression and cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are the 




some  studies,  in  the  situation  where  IIA  is  violated,  a  well-specified  multinomial  logistic  model  is 
comparable in sign and significance of coefficients with nested or mixed logistic models (Cushing and 
Cushing, 2007; Train, 2003). Indeed, our main estimation binary probit regression in the restricted sample 
does not show notable differences from the multinomial logistic regression. For the multinomial logistic 
specification, we obtained estimates for the coefficients on the explanatory variables that were consistent 
(both in sign and significance) with those from the binary probit specifications. 
The Heckman selection model with selection of “any commercial use” in the first stage, addresses 
the selection bias problem. In the selection equation, we regressed “any commercial use” on six variables: 
Technological value, Collaboration, No immediate demand, Number of inventors, Age of invention, and 
Component  familiarity.  The  selection  probability  term  fed  into  the  main  equation  is,  however,  not 
significant (Heckman’s rho=-0.293; p>Chi-square=0.647), indicating that our main specifications are not 
subject to significant bias by removing nonuse patents. 
Before we conclude this section, let us briefly address another feasible source of bias—possible 
self-selection effects related to the missing values on some of the covariates. We examined whether the 
number of dropped observations had to do with self-selection by running the Heckman probit selection 
model with a dummy for complete cases as the dependent variable in the selection equation. The self-
selection effect is not significant as indicated by insignificant correlations between error terms in the 
selection equation and error terms in the outcome equation. Also, we ran the main models with imputed 
values on “technological value” replaced with its mean (=2.19) and its predicted value estimated from the 
regression equation, respectively. While these imputations increase the sample size by about 16% (from 
N=1226 to 1415), we found no notable differences between dummy-adjusted models and the original 
ones. We also ran the models in the imputed sample using bootstrap re-sampling methods. The basic idea 
is  that,  if there  is a significant bias due  to  missing  values,  then the  coefficients  and  standard  errors 
estimated  for  the  subsample  will  be  different  from  the  original  one.  We  re-sampled  50  random 
subsamples from the imputed sample (N=1415) and calculated bootstrap coefficients and standard errors. 
The results are consistent with the results of our main models. Furthermore, we found no significant 
difference in the means of our dependent variables between the full set (N=1807) and the uncensored 
subset (N=1226). However, even if list-wise deletions are not totally random to some extent, this does not 
indicate that we will have biased estimates for the following reasons: first, our sample is not censored by 
the characteristics of the dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2002). Second, the signs and significance of 
the coefficients in the binary probit models are almost identical to those in the probit selection models, 
which suggests that the bias from omitting the selection correction term is small. Therefore, using the 




4.3.2. Endogeneity of the explanatory variables 
Although we control for many factors at the invention and firm levels, we cannot control for firm 
strategy or a management tendency toward internal commercialization that may affect both the internal 
commercialization  decision  and  some  of  our  explanatory  variables.  To  test  the  significance  of 
endogeneity, we estimated bivariate and multivariate probit models using an instrument variable (Greene, 
2003). Fortunately, we have a good instrument that only affects Manufacturing unit and Improvement but 
not the governance choice of commercialization. In the survey, we asked if the invention was an outcome 
of pure inspiration or from one’s normal job not related to inventing and was not further developed in an 
R&D project. This variable is related to Manufacturing unit and Improvement because of the exclusion of 
formal R&D. However, its impacts on the governance choice are not clear. Indeed, the indicator variable 
for purely inspirational inventions is correlated with Manufacturing unit (chi-square=12.30; P<0.00) and 
Improvement  (chi-square=6.31;  P<0.01)  but  not  with  Internal  commercialization  (chi-square=0.47; 
P<0.49). Based on both the bivariate and multivariate estimations we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the error terms of the main equation and instrumented equation, in which we regress Manufacturing 
unit  (or  Improvement)  on  the  indicator  of  pure  inspirational  inventions,  are  related  as  indicated  by 
insignificant estimates of covariance of error terms in all specifications. To sum, we do not find evidence 
that Manufacturing unit and Improvement are endogenous. 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
5.1. Discussion and implications 
In this paper we build on the TCE, capabilities theories and embeddedness perspectives to explain 
why firms choose different modes of commercializing their patented inventions. In particular, we used 
arguments developed in transaction costs economics to explain how technological uncertainty and asset 
specificity  affect  the  exchange  conditions  and,  therefore,  the  governance  choice  in  commercializing 
patented inventions. Conforming to TCE and our arguments,  our empirical test  shows that  the  more 
familiar the technology, the more likely a patented invention is commercialized externally. This finding 
sheds light on the influence of technology evolution (or industry evolution) on governance choice. 
Based on both TCE and arguments from the literature about capabilities, we argue that strong 
coupling with a firm’s existing capabilities raises the propensity of internal commercialization. In our 
arguments, we show that both TCE and capability-based logics lead to consistent prediction, although 
with  different  focuses:  exchange  conditions  for  TCE  and  production  conditions  for  capability-based 




conditions. This suggests the need for further work that explores how exchange conditions interact with 
firm capabilities (Argyres and Zenger, 2008; Jacobides and Winter, 2005). We examined one facet of 
capabilities-exchange co-evolution by testing how the impacts of firm production capabilities on internal 
commercialization change depending on technology familiarity (H2b, Figure 1). We found evidence that 
macro-level  environment  conditions  that  affect  exchange  conditions  (such  as  technology  familiarity) 
moderate the effects of capabilities on governance choice. One practical implication of this finding is that, 
for example, the value of co-specialized assets, as identified by a sharper incentive to use inventions 
internally, will be higher for an emerging technology than a mature technology. 
Finally, as Poppo and Zenger (2002) contended, and the growing literature on open innovation 
and  network  relationships  argue,  existing  studies  about  governance  choice  have  not  given  sufficient 
attention to the effects of inter-firm ties on governance choice (although TCE has begun to incorporate 
relational  contracting  into  the  model,  see  Williamson,  1991,  2002).  This  study  shows  that  R&D 
collaboration influences commercialization strategy, even after controlling for the effects of knowledge 
flows. We show that a particular type of inter-firm ties, horizontal inventive collaboration, raises the 
propensity of external commercialization. We suggest that this is due to increased trust built up during the 
invention  process  that  carries  over  to  influence  the  commercialization  strategy,  complemented  by 
relational inertia. At the same time, information spillovers during the collaborative R&D project may 
reduce the exclusivity advantage of in-house use (or put differently, rent dissipation may have already 
occurred), lowering some of the constraints on external commercialization.  Future work is needed to 
clarify which of these mechanisms is most dominant in determining commercialization mode. We do not 
find  strong  evidence  that  horizontal  collaboration  moderates  the  negative  effects  of  high  technology 
uncertainty on market contracts (in contrast to Uzzi 1997 and Powell 1990).  
This paper contributes to the literature in the following points. First, it shows that theoretical 
constructs from the evolutionary explanation of technology development (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; 
Dosi, 1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Utterback, 1994) and Teece’s dominant design explanation have 
some explanatory power in the governance choice of commercializing patented inventions. In particular, 
we show that technological maturity is associated with more developed markets for technology. We also 
confirm that TCE provides valuable guidance in understanding the governance structure for innovations. 
While much of the TCE research focuses on the make-or-buy decision, we are extending this line of 
research by focusing on the integrate-or-license decisions in the innovation context, providing empirical 
support for the TCE-based predictions. Moreover, whereas most existing studies on licensing consider the 
rate  of  licensing  at  the  firm  or  industry  levels,  we  directly  compare  the  propensity  of  external 
commercialization with internal commercialization at the level of individual inventions, directly testing 




We  also  find  evidence  that  co-specialized  complementary  assets  are  important  for  choice  of 
commercialization mode.  Finally, we find that embedded ties built during the invention process have 
strong effects on the commercialization process.  Prior work has shown that structural embeddedness has 
important  impacts  on  firm  invention  productivity  (Owen-Smith  and  Powell,  2004).  Previous  studies 
showed how particular ties (Afuah, 2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Uzzi, 
1996)  or  breadth/depth  of  external  search  (Katila  and  Ahuja,  2002)  affect  the  firm  or  innovation 
performance.  Future  work  can  develop  these  insights  by  examining  the  effects  of  whole  network 
structural embeddedness (and structural holes) on governance choice (Jones et al., 1997a).  
 
5.2. Limitations and future avenues of research 
While our results are robust to a variety of specifications and tests for selection and endogeneity, 
there are still some important limitations. While we include a broad set of covariates at the technology, 
firm, invention, and project levels, we do not control for firm-specific fixed effects because our data set is 
cross-sectional. The study also does not directly test implications of product market characteristics or 
industry structure. Instead, it controls for broad industry areas and the characteristics of technology fields. 
Also, a fuller understanding of external commercialization will be possible when we can consider dyadic 
relationships and full network structures as well as aspects of financial markets, which we do not address 
in the study. 
Finally, the study compares out-licensing versus in-house use.  However, technologies can be 
simultaneously used in house and licensed. This dual strategy might be especially important under certain 
conditions. For example, Parmigiani and Mitchell (2009) argue that, in the face of uncertainty, firms 
having expertise in multiple component technologies would source the components from both internal 
and external sources rather than from purely internal sources to hedge the risks of unpredicted demand 
fluctuation and to absorb external knowledge. Their arguments are premised on the assumption that firms 
know  more  than  they  produce  (Brusoni  et  al.,  2001)  so  that  outsourcing  firm’s  knowledge  in  the 
components can successfully eradicate the hold-up hazards. Their arguments ground the discussion on an 
additional  dimension  different  from TCE  and  capabilities.  Although  their  arguments  are  not directly 
applicable to commercializing patented inventions, which address the ‘make-or-license decision instead 
of  a  ‘make-or-buy’  decision,  their  risk-hedging  arguments  still  hold.  However,  this  logic  provides  a 
similar prediction on the impact of a strong coupling between an invention and existing capabilities on the 
boundary decision – the strong coupling as a precondition for concurrent sourcing works counter to the 
force toward integration caused by capability and TCE logics.  Because of a limited number of dual use 
cases, we were not able to explore this in detail.  However, future work might focus on this dual use and 




Our results show that technology familiarity, firm capabilities and embedded ties are all important 
drivers of commercialization strategy.  In doing so, we attempt to integrate TCE, firm capabilities and 
network  perspectives  on  governance  of  innovation.  Although  we  were  not  able  to  present  clear  cut 
boundaries between each construct in terms of its effects and scope conditions on governance choice, we 
suggest  that  this  synthetic  view  can  deepen  our  understanding  of  the  interrelationships  among  trust, 
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Table A. 1 Correlation matrix (N=651) 
1  Internal commercialization   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23 
2  Component familiarity  -0.12*  1                                           
3  Manufacturing unit  0.09*  -0.06  1                                         
4  2*3  0  0.09*  0.62*  1                                       
5  Improvement  0.11*  -0.02  0.01  -0.03  1                                     
6  2*5  -0.03  0.6*  -0.05  0.02  0.39*  1                                   
7  Horizontal collaboration  -0.11*  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.07  -0.04  1                                 
8  2*7  -0.1*  0.06  -0.04  -0.02  -0.05  0.01  0.71*  1                               
9  Vertical collaboration  0.05  -0.08*  0.01  -0.03 -0.09*  -0.06  0.21*  0.15*  1                             
10  Public collaboration  -0.1*  0.04  -0.02  -0.01  -0.05  -0.02  0.13*  0.08*  0.13*  1                           
11  Industrial knowledge  0.03  -0.05  0.02  0.08* -0.11*  -0.04  0.1*  0.05  0.28*  0.15*  1                         
12  Public knowledge  -0.18*  0.11*  -0.06  0.02 -0.13*  0.04  0.09*  0.07  0.09*  0.38*  0.47*  1                       
13  Large firm  0.23*  -0.04  -0.1* -0.11*  0.04  -0.06  0.02  0.02  -0.02 -0.15*  -0.01  -0.07  1                     
14  Ln(patent stock)  0.12*  0.01 -0.11*  -0.1*  0.04  -0.02  -0.06  -0.03 -0.14* -0.12* -0.11*  -0.05  0.58*  1                   
15  Technological value  -0.13*  -0.01  -0.01  0.01 -0.12*  -0.08  0  -0.02  0.05  0.08*  0.11*  0.18* -0.12* -0.13*  1                 
16  No immediate demand  0.01  0.01  -0.04  -0.06  0.06  0.02  -0.02  -0.03  0.03  -0.02  -0.01  0.1*  -0.01  0.02  0.1*  1               
17  % Basic R&D  -0.08*  0.04  -0.05  -0.02 -0.11*  -0.04  0.07  0.02  0.01  0.14*  0.11*  0.26*  -0.01  0.02  0.13*  0.11*  1             
18  Product invention  0.07  -0.04  0.01  -0.02  0.05  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  0.01  0.07  -0.04  0.02  0.02  -0.07  -0.03  -0.08  1           
19  Man-months  -0.08*  -0.02  -0.04  -0.04 -0.12*  -0.07  0.06  0.02  0.07  0.07  0.15*  0.22*  -0.02  0.04  0.15*  0  0.07  -0.07  1         
20  Number of inventors  0.01  0.02  -0.07  -0.06  -0.02  0.03  0.02  0  -0.05  -0.02  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.1*  0.05  -0.02  0.02  -0.04  0.29*  1       
21  Complexity of technology  -0.02  0.06  -0.08  -0.05  -0.02  0.01  -0.06  -0.05  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.1*  0.01  -0.05  0.12*  0  0.1* -0.09*  0.01  -0.03  1     
22  Number of claims  -0.05  -0.04  -0.05  -0.01  -0.04  0.01  0.01  -0.02  0  0.03  -0.01  -0.07 -0.11* -0.14*  0.11*  -0.03  -0.02  -0.05  0.02  0.09*  0.07  1   
23  Age of invention (months)  -0.01  -0.02  0.07  0.07  -0.02  0.02  -0.05  -0.04  0  0.02  0.09*  0.12*  0.1*  0.13*  -0.07  0  0.01  -0.03  0.02  0  0.05  -0.1*  1 
24  Electrical engineering  -0.04  0.11*  -0.06  -0.01  -0.05  0.05  -0.02  0 -0.09*  -0.04 -0.09*  0.01  0.05  0.14*  -0.01  0.05  0.03  0.03  -0.06  -0.08  -0.06  -0.01  0.08* 
25  Chemistry, pharmaceuticals  -0.06  0.14*  -0.08  0.01  -0.02  0.07  -0.01  0.03  -0.04  0.09*  0.07  0.17*  0.03  -0.05  0.04  0  0.15* -0.11*  0.09*  0.05  0.26*  -0.03  -0.04 
26  Process  -0.01  -0.08  0.02  -0.02  0.03  -0.06  0.05  0.01  0.04  -0.04  -0.01 -0.14*  0.03  -0.01  -0.02  -0.04  -0.02  -0.1*  -0.06  -0.01  0.06  -0.01  -0.02 
27  Mechanical eng, machinery  0.14*  -0.15*  0.14*  -0.01  0.01 -0.08*  -0.02  -0.04  0.08  -0.06  -0.03 -0.14*  0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0.02 -0.11*  0.11*  -0.06  -0.1* -0.13*  0  -0.04 
28  Consumer goods  0.01  -0.07  0.06  0  -0.04  -0.04  0.06  0  0.02  0.01  0.08*  -0.05  -0.1* -0.09*  0.02  -0.08  -0.04  0.12*  0.02  -0.02  -0.02  0.05  0 
 




Table 1. Sample statistics (N=651). 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Data source 
Internal commercialization  0.737  0.440  0  1  Survey 
Explanatory variables           
Component familiarity (/1000)  0.087  0.151  0.000  2.081  USPTO 
Manufacturing unit  0.108  0.311  0  1  Survey 
Improvement invention  0.427  0.495  0  1  Survey 
Horizontal collaboration -   0.075  0.263  0  1  Survey 
Controls           
Vertical collaboration  0.272  0.445  0  1  Survey 
Public collaboration  0.070  0.256  0  1  Survey 
Industrial knowledge  0.293  0.196  0  1  Survey 
Public knowledge  0.255  0.209  0  0.900  Survey 
Large firm (employees >500)  0.824  0.381  0  1  Survey & Patent 
Capital intensity (M$/employee)  0.058  0.088  0  0.823  COMPUSTAT 
Dummy for missing capital intensity  0.321  0.467  0  1  COMPUSTAT 
Ln(patent stock)  5.014  2.800  0  9.865  PATSTAT 
Technological value  2.427  1.087  1  4  Survey 
No immediate demand  0.186  0.390  0  1  Survey 
% Basic R&D (/100)  0.067  0.153  0  1  Survey 
Product invention  0.536  0.499  0  1  Survey 
Man-months  0.193  0.229  0.005  1  Survey 
Number of inventors  2.899  1.983  1  16  Patent 
Complexity of technology (# USPC)  4.310  3.305  1  23  Patent 
Number of claims  22.823  16.997  1  181  Patent 
Age of invention (months)  69.276  12.002  38  92  Patent 
Electrical engineering  0.258  0.438  0  1  Patent 
Instruments  0.198  0.399  0  1  Patent 
Chemistry, pharmaceuticals  0.220  0.414  0  1  Patent 
Process eng, special equipment  0.144  0.351  0  1  Patent 
Mechanical eng, machinery  0.142  0.349  0  1  Patent 






Table 2. Probit regression of internal commercialization on familiarity, links to capabilities and 
inter-organizational ties. 
  Base 
Model    Full models    Adding interaction terms    Marginal Effects 
  (1)     (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)    Large firm  Small firm 
    -0.684**  -0.681*    -0.666  -0.590*    -0.173*  -0.235*  Component familiarity 
(/1000)      (0.338)  (0.353)    (0.435)  (0.344)    (0.102)  (0.137) 
      0.479**      0.682**    0.146***  0.252***  Manufacturing unit 
      (0.213)      (0.296)    (0.048)  (0.098) 
            -2.682    -0.788  -1.070  Component familiarity  
* Manufacturing unit              (2.618)    (0.784)  (1.044) 
    0.270**      0.271**          Improvement 
    (0.119)      (0.133)         
          -0.019          Component familiarity  
* Improvement            (0.689)         
   -0.627*** -0.612***    -0.579**  -0.552**    -0.188*  -0.212**  Horizontal collaboration 
    (0.201)  (0.201)    (0.266)  (0.264)    (0.100)  (0.093) 
          -0.708  -0.837    -0.246  -0.334  Component familiarity  
* Horizontal collaboration            (2.642)  (2.704)    (0.795)  (1.079) 
    0.217  0.212    0.219  0.203    0.057  0.081  Vertical collaboration 
    (0.146)  (0.147)    (0.146)  (0.147)    (0.040)  (0.058) 
    0.098  0.103    0.096  0.089    0.025  0.036  Public collaboration 
    (0.237)  (0.234)    (0.237)  (0.234)    (0.065)  (0.093) 
1.099***    1.031***  0.955***    1.030***  1.008***    0.296***  0.402***  Industrial knowledge 
(0.334)    (0.356)  (0.354)    (0.356)  (0.350)    (0.105)  (0.140) 
-1.458***  -1.373*** -1.379***    -1.371***  -1.379***    -0.406***  -0.550***  Public knowledge 
(0.325)    (0.349)  (0.346)    (0.349)  (0.345)    (0.108)  (0.138) 
0.741***    0.766***  0.792***    0.765***  0.784***    0.284***  0.284***  Large firm 
(0.176)    (0.179)  (0.183)    (0.179)  (0.184)    (0.071)  (0.071) 
-0.006    -0.007  -0.003    -0.007  -0.003    -0.001  -0.001  Ln(patent stock) 
(0.025)    (0.026)  (0.026)    (0.026)  (0.026)    (0.008)  (0.011) 
-0.101*    -0.104*  -0.105*    -0.104*  -0.104*    -0.031*  -0.041*  Technological value 
(0.057)    (0.058)  (0.058)    (0.058)  (0.058)    (0.017)  (0.023) 
0.138    0.093  0.130    0.092  0.121    0.034  0.048  No immediate demand 
(0.149)    (0.149)  (0.150)    (0.149)  (0.151)    (0.041)  (0.060) 
-0.148    -0.038  -0.083    -0.043  -0.093    -0.027  -0.037  % Basic R&D 
(0.395)    (0.405)  (0.402)    (0.405)  (0.403)    (0.118)  (0.161) 
0.096    0.075  0.106    0.075  0.104    0.032  0.041  Product invention 
(0.115)    (0.116)  (0.116)    (0.117)  (0.116)    (0.036)  (0.046) 
-0.296    -0.259  -0.312    -0.262  -0.328    -0.097  -0.131  Man-months 
(0.255)    (0.266)  (0.259)    (0.266)  (0.259)    (0.077)  (0.103) 
0.028    0.037  0.037    0.036  0.035    0.010  0.014  Number of inventors 
(0.034)    (0.035)  (0.035)    (0.035)  (0.035)    (0.010)  (0.014) 
0.015    0.011  0.014    0.011  0.013    0.004  0.005  Complexity of technology 
(# USPC)  (0.018)    (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.005)  (0.007) 
-0.004    -0.005  -0.004    -0.005  -0.004    -0.001  -0.002  Number of claims 
(0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.001)  (0.001) 




(0.005)    (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.001)  (0.002) 
-0.093    0.017  -0.017    0.018  -0.023    -0.007  -0.009  Electrical engineering 
(0.166)    (0.168)  (0.167)    (0.168)  (0.167)    (0.049)  (0.067) 
-0.131    -0.050  -0.068    -0.048  -0.064    -0.019  -0.025  Chemistry, 
pharmaceuticals  (0.176)    (0.179)  (0.179)    (0.179)  (0.180)    (0.055)  (0.072) 
-0.165    -0.122  -0.156    -0.123  -0.171    -0.053  -0.068  Process eng, special 
equipment  (0.196)    (0.200)  (0.201)    (0.200)  (0.202)    (0.067)  (0.079) 
0.551**    0.599***  0.507**    0.598***  0.485**    0.115***  0.186**  Mechanical eng, 
machinery  (0.223)    (0.224)  (0.224)    (0.224)  (0.226)    (0.043)  (0.080) 
0.050    0.167  0.072    0.163  0.038    0.011  0.015  Consumer goods & 
Construction  (0.307)    (0.320)  (0.310)    (0.320)  (0.311)    (0.089)  (0.124) 
0.609    0.548  0.683    0.548  0.682        Constant 
(0.435)     (0.455)  (0.449)     (0.457)  (0.451)          
Log Likelihood  -330.3    -321.4  -321.2    -321.4  -320.6    -320.6  -320.6 
Wald chi2  82.04    100.5  96.38    100.9  96.96    96.96  96.96 
Pseudo R2  0.114    0.138  0.138    0.138  0.140    0.140  0.140 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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